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321Computational Imaginaries: 
Some Final Remarks on Leibniz, Llull and Rethinking 
the History of Calculating Machines
Jonathan Gray
Leibniz sat gingerly on the edge of the bed, and opened the box. 
—Neil Stephenson, 2004
Where do computers come from? How are historical accounts enlisted in the 
service of different ways of doing and thinking about computing? In this chapter 
I examine the role and reception of “combinatorial” ideas of Gottfried Leibniz, 
Ramon Llull, and associated actors in histories and imaginaries of computing. 
Leibniz is accorded a notable role in various contemporary histories of compu-
tation, by practitioners and researchers alike. Although it is questionable the 
extent to which one can make the case for a direct, unbroken, and material line 
between his calculating machines and the devices and practices of modern 
digital computing, nevertheless he is considered to have a significant influence on 
ideas about computation and visions of computational reason.
 As Norbert Wiener writes in his seminal 1948 work Cybernetics: Or Control and 
Communication in the Animal and the Machine: “if I were to choose a patron saint 
for cybernetics out of the history of science, I should have to choose Leibniz.” [1] 
Scientist and inventor Stephen Wolfram credits Leibniz with anticipating contem- 
porary projects by “imagining a whole architecture for how knowledge would […] 
be made computational,” suggesting that “many aspects of Leibniz’s core vision 
are finally coming to fruition, albeit in ways he could never have imagined.” [2] 
Other recent writers and commentators describe Leibniz as the “godfather of the 
modern algorithm” [3] and the “man who envisioned the systems and machines 
that would define the digital revolution” and “paved the way for the information 
age.” [4] This role has spilled over from history into fiction. Science fiction writer 
Neal Stephenson dramatizes Leibniz’s role in the emergence of computation 
in his novel Quicksilver, which provides the backstory for his 1999 Cryptonomicon, 
blending historical and fictional accounts of computation and cryptography.
 What are the implications of the invocation and connection of these figures 
to contemporary computing practices? What kinds of perspectives are genera- 
ted, what are we led to attend to, and what is left out? The work of Leibniz and 
Llull may be considered in relation to contemporary “computational imaginaries.” 
It is important to note that the notion of “imaginaries” relates not only to 
what people say and think, but also what they do (including, for example, how they 
 [Epigraph] 
Neil Stephenson, Quicksilver (London: Arrow 
Books, 2004), 269.
[1] Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics: Or Control and 
Communication in the Animal and the Machine 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985), 12. 
[2] Stephen Wolfram, “Dropping In on Gottfried 
Leibniz,” Stephen Wolfram Blog, May 14, 2013, 
available at: http://blog.stephenwolfram.com/ 
2013/05/dropping-in-on-gottfried-leibniz/2013. 
[3] Christopher Steiner, Automate This: How 
Algorithms Took Over Our Markets, Our Jobs, 
and the World (London: Penguin, 2012), 57.
[4] Dan Falk, “The Philosopher Who Helped Create 
the Information Age,” Slate, November 14, 2016, 
retrieved from http://www.slate.com/articles/
technology/future_tense/2016/11/the_18th_ 
century_philosopher_who_helped_create_the_ 
information_age.html. 
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associate and their material practices). Recent research has explored how the 
notion of “social imaginaries” can be used to study how communities assemble 
around shared concerns with technical infrastructures and practices. [5] 
Sheila Jasanoff suggests that the notion of “sociotechnical imaginaries” may 
be understood as “collectively held and performed visions of desirable futures” 
drawing on a combination of science and technology studies and social and 
political theory. [6] 
 The reception of Leibniz’s vast and heterogeneous corpus has been conspic- 
uously slow and uneven. Only a comparatively small portion of his many 
writings were published during his lifetime, and it would not be until the mid-
eighteenth century when more substantive collections of his work began to 
be published. [7] Different aspects of his work have been mobilized and positioned 
as important in relation to different aspects of computing. Some of these as- 
pects are illustrated below, as highlighted in texts by Wiener and Wolfram that 
relate Leibniz’s work to cybernetics and modern computing. It is worth noting 
that such passages reflect imaginaries about Leibniz and the significance of his 
work as well as imaginaries about computing. [8]
Theme Wiener, 1985 Wolfram, 2013
Intellectual breadth and 
connecting work in different 
fields
“full command of all of 
the intellectual activity of 
his day” (2)
“many seemingly disparate 
and unrelated things”; 
“systematization and formal-
ization of knowledge”
Mathematical notation “mathematical notation” (12) Examples of mathematical 
notation for infinite series, 
continued fractions and calcu- 
lus; “the effort he put into 
notation, and the clarity 
of reasoning about mathe- 
matical structures and 
processes that it brought”.
Logic “calculus of reasoning” (12); 
“mathematical logic” (12)
“logic of invention”
Mechanization of thought “mechanization of processes 
of thought” (12)
“the notion that computation 
is in a sense mechanical”
Universal language (characte-
ristica universalis)
“universal symbolism” (12) “alphabet of human thought”; 
“decomposing ideas into 
simple components”; “ars 
characteristica”; “formal, 
symbolic, representations 
for a wide range of different 
kinds of things”
Conceptualizing computation “calculus ratiocinator” (12, 
125); elsewhere he writes “the 
general idea of a computing 
machine is nothing but a 
mechanization of Leibniz’s 
calculus ratiocinator” (Wiener, 
1948: 214)
“a core intellectual direction 
that is curiously close to the 
modern computational one”
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Calculating machines “construction of computing 
machines in the metal” (12)
“resolved to build an actual 
mechanical calculator for 
doing arithmetic”
Monads (and establishing 
simplest entities of which 
more complex entities are 
comprised)
“monads” (41, 58) “With binary, Leibniz was in a 
sense seeking the simplest 
possible underlying structure. 
And no doubt he was doing 
something similar when he 
talked about what he called 
‘monads’.”
Relations of Leibniz' work to cybernetics and computing
Perhaps the most emblematic (although arguably not the most original) of 
Leibniz’s contribution towards modern computing are his various prototypes of 
calculating machines. Though most of them were lost, one of these machines 
was found discarded in the corner of the attic by workmen in the course of repair- 
ing a leaking roof at the University of Göttingen in 1879. With its cylinders 
of polished brass and oaken handles, the machine, which Leibniz had dubbed 
“Instrumentum Arithmeticum,” was one of a string of mechanical calculators inno- 
vating on the work of the French philosopher Blaise Pascal. Supported by a 
network of professors, preachers, and friends, and developed with the technical 
assistance of a series of itinerant and precariously employed clockmakers, 
mechanics, artisans, and a butler — Leibniz’s machine aspired to provide less 
than even the most basic of today’s calculators: modestly expanding the 
repertoire of operations from addition and subtraction to include multiplication 
and division. [9]
 Three centuries before Douglas Engelbart’s “Mother of All Demos” received 
a standing ovation in 1968, Leibniz’s machine faltered through live demon-
strations in London and Paris. It suffered from a series of financial setbacks and 
technical issues, and cost a small fortune to construct. The Royal Society in-
vited him to come back once it was fully operational. There is some speculation 
that — despite Leibniz’s rhetoric in letters and publications — it is possible 
that the machine never actually worked as it was supposed to. [10] Nevertheless, 
it exercised a powerful grip on the imagination of later technicians and was 
cited as an influence on the work of generations to come. Leibniz’s machine be- 
came part of textbooks and industry narratives about the development of 
[5] Christopher Kelty, “Geeks, Social Imaginaries, 
and Recursive Publics,” Cultural Anthropology 
20, 2 (2005): 185–214, available at 
https://doi.org/10.1525/can.2005.20.2.185; 
Kelty, Two Bits: The Cultural Significance of Free 
Software: The Cultural Significance of Free 
Software and the Internet (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2008).
[6] Sheila Jasanoff, “Future Imperfect: Science, 
Technology, and the Imaginations of Modernity,” 
in Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical 
Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power, 
ed. Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2015), 19.
[7] Catherine Wilson, “The Reception of Leibniz in the 
Eighteenth Century,” in The Cambridge Companion 
to Leibniz, ed. Nicholas Jolley (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 442–70.
[8] I am grateful to Bernard Dionysius Geoghegan for 
conversations in which he suggested clarifying 
this point, particularly in relation to recent 
scholarship on Norbert Wiener and histories of 
cybernetics.
[9] Cf. Florin-Stefan Morar, “Reinventing Machines: 
The Transmission History of the Leibniz Calculator,” 
The British Journal for the History of Science 48, 1 
(2015): 123–46.
[10] Ibid., 18.
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Fig. 1
Details of the mechanisms of the Leibniz 
calculator, illustration from Jacob Leupold, 
Theatrum Arithmetico-Geometricum, Das ist: 
Schau-Platz der Rechen- und Meß-Kunst […] 
(Leipzig, 1725), tab. 8
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computation (see fig. 1). IBM included a replica of one of these machines in their 
“Antique Attic” contending that it is an important influence on “many later 
calculating systems.” [11] 
 Leibniz left an extensive scientific and technological legacy that extended well 
beyond his prototype calculating machines — including contributions towards 
the modern binary number system as well as integral and differential calculus. 
But he also articulated a broader computational imaginary which connected 
these various projects, which sought to explore the analytical and generative pos- 
sibilities of rendering the world computable. Leibniz’s interest in this area can 
be traced back to his 1666 Dissertatio de arte combinatoria — an extended version 
of his doctoral dissertation in which he explores what was known as the “art 
of combinations” (or “combinatorial art”), which would enable its practitioners 
to generate novel ideas and inventions, as well as to analyze and break down 
complex and difficult ideas into more simple elements. He sought to demonstrate 
the widespread applicability of this art to advance understanding of logic, law, 
theology, physics, and music.
 Leibniz’s curiosity around this topic was sparked by a group called the “Her- 
born Encyclopaedists” through whom he became acquainted with the works 
of the Majorcan philosopher, logician, and mystical thinker Ramon Llull. [12] 
Llull’s Ars magna (or “Ultimate General Art”) from 1308 outlines a form of analysis 
and argumentation based on working with different permutations of funda-
mental attributes.
 Llull sought to create a universal tool for helping to convert people to the 
Christian faith through logical argumentation. He proposed eighteen fundamen-
tal general principles (Goodness, Greatness, Eternity, Power, Wisdom, Will, 
Virtue, Truth, Glory, Difference, Concordance, Contrariety, Beginning, Middle, 
End, Majority, Equality, and Minority), accompanied by a set of definitions, 
rules, and figures in order to guide the process of argumentation, which is orga- 
nized around different permutations of the principles. The Art was to be used 
to generate and address questions such as “Is eternal goodness concordant?”, 
“What does the difference of eternal concordance consist of?”, or “Can goodness 
be great without concordance?”.
 Llull thought that the Art could be used to “banish all erroneous opinions” 
and to arrive at “true intellectual certitude removed from any doubt.” [13] Llull 
drew in turn on the medieval Arabic zairja, described by historian Ibn Khaldūn 
as “a branch of the science of letter magic […] the technique of finding out 
answers from questions by means of connections existing between the letters 
[11] IBM, “Leibniz Calculating Machine (Replica),” 
IBM.com, n. d., available at: https://www-03.ibm. 
com/ibm/history/exhibits/attic3/attic3_037.html.
[12] Cf. Umberto Eco, The Search for the Perfect 
Language, trans. J. Fentress (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1995); John R. Welch, “Llull and Leibniz: The Logic 
of Discovery,” Catalan Review 4 (1990): 75–83; 
Ana Maróstica, “Ars Combinatoria and Time: Llull, 
Leibniz and Peirce,” Studia Lulliana 32, 2 (1992): 
105–34; Leroy E. Loemker, “Leibniz and the 
Herborn Encyclopedists,” in The Philosophy 
of Leibniz and the Modern World, ed. Ivor Leclerc 
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1973); 
Olga Pombo “Three Roots for Leibniz’s Contri- 
bution to the Computational Conception of 
Reason,” in Programs, Proofs, Processes, ed. 
Fernando Ferreira, Benedikt Löwe, Elvira 
Mayordomo, and Luís Mendes Gomes (Berlin: 
Springer, 2010), 352–61; Sara L. Uckelman, 
“Computing with Concepts, Computing with 
Numbers: Llull, Leibniz, and Boole,” in Ferreira et 
al. (ed.), Programs, Proofs, Processes, 427–37.
[13] Ramon Llull, Ars Generalis Ultima, trans. Y.  
Dambergs, 2003, retrieved from: http://lullianarts. 
narpan.net/Ars-Magna/1-2-3-4.htm.
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of the expressions used in the question.” [14] The zairja was an algorithmic process 
for calculating truth on the basis of a finite number of elements. Its practitioners 
would give advice or make predictions on the basis of interpretations of strings of 
letters resulting from a calculation. Llull’s experimentation channeled this pro- 
cedural conception of reasoning, and was drawn upon by the intellectual milieu 
in which Leibniz developed his early ideas.
 While critical towards the details of Llull’s proposed categories and proce-
dures, Leibniz was taken with his overarching vision of the combinatorial 
Art. Leibniz drew two key aspirations from Llull’s work: the idea of fundamental 
conceptual elements, and the idea of a method through which to combine and 
calculate with them. The former enables us to reduce more complex ideas down 
simpler ones, or an “alphabet of human thoughts.” For “everything which exists 
or which can be thought,” Leibniz wrote, “must be compounded of parts.” [15] 
The latter enable us to reason with these elements precisely and without error, as 
well as generate new insights and ideas. Just as all words in a language could 
be represented by the comparatively small number of letters in an alphabet, so 
the whole world of nature and thought could be considered in terms of a number 
of fundamental elements — which he sought to derive through what he called 
the characteristica universalis, or universal language. The combinatorial art would 
not only facilitate such analysis, but would also provide means to compose new 
ideas, entities, inventions, and worlds.
 Leibniz spared no modesty in promoting the Art and the various initiatives 
associated with it for which he hoped to raise funds from prospective patrons. 
He presented his project as being the world’s most powerful instrument, an end 
to all argument, one of humanity’s most wonderful inventions (fulfilling a 
timeless dream shared by everyone from the Pythagoreans to the Cartesians); 
the ultimate source of answers to some of the world’s most complex and difficult 
theological, moral, legal, or scientific questions; and a foolproof means to 
convert people to Christianity and propagate the faith, amongst other things.
 In support of his project he argued that “no man who is not a prophet or 
a prince can ever undertake anything of greater good to mankind or more fitting 
for the divine glory” and that “nothing could be proposed that would be more 
important for the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith.” [16] In a letter to 
Johann Friedrich from 1679 he described his project of the universal language 
as “the great instrument of reason, which will carry the forces of the mind further 
than the microscope has carried those of sight.” Later he wrote:
 The only way to rectify our reasonings is to make them as tangible as those 
of the Mathematicians, so that we can find our error at a glance, and 
when there are disputes among persons, we can simply say: Let us calculate, 
without further ado, to see who is right. [17]
[14] Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to 
History, vol. 3, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958), 182.
[15] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophical Papers 
and Letters, ed. and trans. Leroy E. Loemker 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), 80.
[16] Ibid., 225, 262.
[17] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Leibniz: Selections, 
ed. and trans. Philip P. Wiener (New York: Scribner, 
1951, 51.
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Ultimately, he hoped that the combination of a perspicuous thought language 
of “pure” concepts, combined with formalized processes and methods for 
reasoning, akin to those used in mathematics, would lead to the mechanization 
and automation of reasoning. By means of new artificial languages and meth- 
ods, our ordinary and imperfect ways of reasoning with words and ideas would 
give way to a formal, symbolic, rule-governed science of reasoning — conceived 
of as a computational process. Disputes, conflict, and grievances arising from ill- 
formed opinions, emotional hunches, biases, prejudices, and misunderstandings 
would give way to consensus, peace, and progress.
 Jonathan Swift later parodied the mechanical conception of invention ad- 
vanced by Llull and Leibniz in Gulliver’s Travels. In the fictional city of Lagado, the 
protagonist encounters a device known as “the engine” which is intended by 
its inventor to enable anyone to “write books in philosophy, poetry, politics, laws, 
mathematics, and theology, without the least assistance from genius or study.” [18] 
The mechanical combinatorial approach to cultural creation that Swift treated 
as an absurd caricature became a productive experimental technique for later 
writers, artists, and musicians — from the permutational works of American com- 
poser John Cage, to generative poetic experiments of the French literary group 
Oulipo, to more recent procedural approaches of digital and software art. [19] More- 
over, the mechanization and externalization of reasoning processes exhibited 
by machine learning technologies and algorithms has not only become socially 
and culturally productive, but economically lucrative for today’s silicon empires.
 There are few contenders in the history of philosophy to rival the optimism 
that Leibniz had for his project as a kind of panacea to solve many of the world’s 
problems. Many of the ideas of his youth never left him. In a 1714 letter, two 
years before his death, he laments that he was unable to make more progress:
 I should venture to add that if I had been less distracted, or if I were younger 
or had talented young men to help me, I should still hope to create a kind 
of spécieuse générale, in which all truths of reason would be reduced to a 
kind of calculus. At the same time this could be a kind of universal language 
or writing, though infinitely different from all such languages which have 
thus far been proposed, for the characters and the words themselves would 
give directions to reason, and the errors (except those of fact) would be only 
mistakes in calculation. [20]
As ever more aspects of earthly life are rendered quantifiable, harvested into clouds, 
funneled into algorithmic engines — leading to what has been called plane-
tary-scale computation” — these dreams of the vast creative and emancipatory 
[18] Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels into Several 
Remote Nations of the World (London: George Bell 
and Sons, 1899), 191–192.
[19] Cf. Johanna Drucker and Bethany Nowviskie, 
“Speculative Computing: Aesthetic Provocations 
in Humanities Computing,” in A Companion 
to Digital Humanities, ed. Susan Schreibman, Ray 
Siemens, and John Unsworth (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2004), 431–47; M. Beatrice Fazi and Matthew Fuller, 
“Computational Aesthetics,” in A Companion 
to Digital Art, ed. C. Paul (Chichester: John Wiley, 
2016), 281–96; Olga Goriunova, Read_me: Software 
Art and Cultures Edition 2004 (Aarhus: Digital 
Aesthetics Research Centre, University of Aarhus, 
2004); Janet Zweig, “Ars Combinatoria,” 
Art Journal 56, 3 (1997): 20–29, reprinted pp. 
XX–XX, this volume.
[20] Leibniz quoted in Donald Rutherford, “Philosophy 
and Language in Leibniz,” in Jolley (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, 224–69, here 239.
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possibilities of procedural reasoning processes endure. [21] The initial trickles 
of Llull’s and Leibniz’s arcane combinatorial fantasies have gradually given way to 
ubiquitous computational technologies, practices, and imaginaries which are 
interwoven into the fabric of our worlds — the broader consequences of which 
are still unfolding around us. The objects of their embryonic faith have become 
the living a priori of the digital age — providing the conditions of possibility for 
our experience and our reflection, our forms of sociality, and our institutions of 
judgement — regardless of whether the machines do what we think they do or not.
 What can we learn by relating these developments to the computational 
imaginaries of Leibniz and Llull? What do such histories encourage us to attend 
to, and what do they leave out? Though there are numerous differences and dis- 
continuities, the way in which these histories have been mobilized in relation 
to modern computing tells us about enduring imaginaries of the possibility and 
desirability of computability. Leibniz’s and Llull’s ideas are rooted in philoso-
phical, ontological, and theological conceptions of the reducibility of complex 
phenomena into an array of basic elements, from which the combinatorial arts 
obtain their power and relevance. This is often portrayed as a project of discovery 
and uncovering these elements.
 By contrast, we may perhaps consider contemporary practices and devices in 
terms of their work to make things computable. This includes, for example, so- 
cial, cultural, and political practices of classification [22]; the institutional contexts 
of information processing [23]; and different forms of systematically under-
recognized intellectual and organizational labor involved in computation, such 
as the neglected role of women. [24] Computation can be considered as socially 
and historically situated and distributed accomplishment, which involves an entan- 
glement of human and non-human actors, discursive and material practices. 
Rather than seeing figures such as Leibniz and Llull as part of the historical cre- 
dentialing of dominant conceptions and practices, we may reconsider their 
role in relation to alternative narratives which interrogate and situate imaginaries 
of universal computability in relation to an array of epistemic cultures and 
politics, from Majorcan mysticism and medieval Arabic divination, to patronage, 
wars, and empires. Critical inquiry into imaginaries of computability might 
also thus contribute to other ways of thinking about making things computable.
[21] Benjamin Bratton, The Stack: On Software and 
Sovereignty (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2016).
[22] Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Sorting 
Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000).
[23] Jon Agar, The Government Machine: A Revolution-
ary History of the Computer (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 2003). 
[24] Marie Hicks, Programmed Inequality: How Britain 
Discarded Women Technologists and Lost 
Its Edge in Computing (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 2017).
